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INTRODUCTION

Anxieties about overpublication are not new. Three thousand years
have passed since King Solomon's comment, "[o]f making many
books there is no end."' His remark rings especially true in law. As
the law advances, it leaves behind a paper trail which defines the content of the common law. Oliver Wendell Holmes had this in mind
when he said, "The history of what the law has been is necessary to
the knowledge of what the law is."'2 That trail continues to grow. But
unlimited growth has its price. Rule 90 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure (Rule 90) 3 represents an effort to extend relief to swollen law libraries. The heart of the rule, part (i), prohibits the citation
of unpublished opinions "as authority." 4 Its scope is the subject of
this article.
A.

Concern over UnrestrictedPublication

"Since the early 19th century," one writer begins, "American legal
scholars have warned against the uncontrolled proliferation of law reports." 5 The British have been bothered for even longer. Their concerns date back at least as far as Lord Chief Justice Hale's 1671
1. Ecclesiastes 12:12.
2. OLIVER W. HOLMES,

JR., THE COMMON LAW 37 (Little, Brown and Co. 1881). "In
order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become." Id. at

1.
3. TEX. R. App. P. 90.
4. TEX. R. App. P. 90(i).
5. J. Myron Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of Appellate
Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REV. 791, 791 (1975); see also id. (quoting as example Bliss &
White, The Common Law, 10 N. AM. REV. (n.s.) 411, 433 (1824)).
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observation that "as the rolling of a snowball, it increaseth in bulk in
every age, until it becomes utterly unmanageable." 6 By 1949, scholars questioned whether legal writers were, themselves, discussing the
problem too much.7
In Texas, worries about judicial overproduction have persisted
throughout the twentieth century." An early protest appeared in the
first volume of the Texas Law Review. The writer was presumably
referring to quantity rather than quality when he described Texas decisional law as "a mountainous pile." 9 He warned of a system "fast
verging upon a state of legal chaos."' 10 Although the Texas Supreme
Court began to use per curiam opinions more frequently around
1925,1 perhaps as a corrective device, the flood hardly abated. Texas
now has more judges and more courts than ever before 2 and history
offers no reason to expect retrenchment.
6. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 141 (1963).
7. John J. O'Connell, A Dissertation on Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 13, 14 n.3
(1949).
8. See A.H. McKnight, Judge Gallagheron Appellate Procedure, 6 TEX. L. REV. 75, 76
(1927) (reviewing article by intermediate court judge). McKnight noted:
A question that has been considerably discussed among members of the bar is whether the
opinions of the Courts of Civil Appeals should be published and, if so, to what extent and
when; and to this question Judge Gallagher devotes considerable attention. He refers to
the change in the law made in 1901, requiring the Courts of Civil Appeals to make and file
conclusions of fact and law upon each material point assigned as error therein, and to the
1905 enactment, requiring the courts to decide all issues presented to them by proper
assignments of error.

Id.
9. C.T. McCormick, Stemming the Tide of Judicial Opinions, I TEX. L.

REV.

450, 450

(1923).
10. Id. at 451.
11. See Ewell H. Muse, Jr., Note, 12 TEX. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (1934) (noting use of per
curiam opinions since 1925).
12. See Clarence Guittard, The Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals, 14 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 549, 550-53 (1983) (noting additions to state judiciary). Another judge has written:
When the Texas Legislature in 1981 increased the number of intermediate appellate
justices to eighty, many thought this would solve the delay problem in the Texas appellate
process. Instead, at the end of the last fiscal year, Texans had nearly a thousand cases
which had been pending in the fourteen courts of appeals for more than one year. The
average time between the filing and disposition of a case by opinion had increased to
almost a year. ...
With the number of new filings each year, and the increase in the Texas population, it
does not take much imagination to discern that unless remedial measures are demanded
and taken by the organized bar of this state, that this situation will deteriorate.
Jim Brady, Reducing Appellate Delay---A "Fast Track" System, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 179,
180 (1986).
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Concern over Restricted Publication

The present scheme creates two classes of judicial opinions, published and unpublished. Unpublished opinions are not supposed to
count for purposes of stare decisis; published opinions are. Rule 90(i)
reads in full: "Unpublished opinions shall not be cited as authority by
counsel or by a court." In order to understand the rule's meaning and
importance, it is necessary to examine the framework for opinion production. Rule 90 regulates the issuance of opinions from the courts of
appeals. Part (a) requires intermediate courts to issue a written opinion in conjunction with the decision of each case:
The court of appeals shall hand down a written opinion which shall be
as brief as practicable but which shall address every issue raised and
necessary to final disposition of the appeal. Where the issues are clearly
settled, the court shall write a brief memorandum opinion which should
not be published.
There is no such requirement for the supreme court 3 and "[n]o one
seriously questions the advisability of publishing most decisions of the
highest court of any jurisdiction."' 4 Rather, publication rules are the
business of intermediate courts. Because intermediate courts lack the
power to screen out unimportant cases through discretionary jurisdiction, "the publication of these opinions is an area that invites
regulation."'I5
Texas courts of appeals ordinarily sit in panels of three,' 6 and the
panel that hears the case is responsible for producing an opinion.
Typically, one of the three judges is chosen as the author, although
the court may issue the decision per curiam. Rule 90(b) resolves the
matter by a majority vote of the same panel. 1 7 Also subject to majority vote is whether the opinion shall be published.' Although the
13. See TEX. R. App. P. 181 (stating that "the opinion of the court will be reduced to
writing in such cases as the court deems of sufficient importance to be reported"). For reasons
more historical than structural, the supreme court has its own set of rules. One commonly
finds asymmetries between a supreme court rule and its court of appeals counterpart.
14. Robert L. Black, Jr., Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U.
CIN. L. REV. 477, 477 (1981).
15. Id.
16. See TEX. R. App. P. 79(a) (calling for three-judge panels).
17. The decision might be reposed somewhere other than the panel. See Harnischfeger
Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 974, 976 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that "Wisconsin has a
judicial committee in charge of publication, and the decision is made by judges other than
those responsible for the opinion").
18. TEX. R. App. P. 90(b) provides:
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rule literally permits a party to make a motion for nonpublication,
during these days of more or less universal publication, courts usually
refuse this request since the opinions are public records and are available to anyone requesting a copy. 1 9 Naturally, there is little precedent
on point.
Two types of supreme court action can cause an unpublished opinion to become reported by operation of law. 20 First, when the
supreme court refuses an application for writ of error, it effectively
adopts the lower court opinion as its own. 2 A decision that receives
such an imprimatur is to be published. But true refusal of a writ
should not be confused with denial, refusal "n.r.e.," or other varieties
of writ disposition. 22 Second, when the supreme court grants an application for writ of error, it is agreeing to take some sort of action.
Analysis of supreme court activity is advanced by requiring publication of the lower court's opinion. The facts, for example, may receive
more attention in the intermediate court's discussion.
A respectable rule must provide standards for separating the sheep

DETERMINATION TO PUBLISH. A majority of the justices participating in the decision of
a case shall determine, prior to the time it is issued, whether an opinion meets the criteria
for publishing.... Any party may move the appellate court to reconsider the determination whether to publish an opinion. The justices participating in the decision of a case
may reconsider their determination whether to publish an opinion after it has issued.
However, the appellate court shall not order any unpublished opinion to be published
after the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals has acted on any party's application for writ of error, discretionary review, or any other relief. The Supreme Court or the
Court of Criminal Appeals may on request of any party or non-party to a court of appeals
decision order a court of appeals opinion published at any time.
TEX. R. App. P. 90(b). This is not as simple as it appears. Though the rule formally requires a
majority vote for publication, that limitation may be circumvented. A holdout may write a
separate opinion and order it published. When a separate opinion is published, the majority
opinion must also be published. TEX. R. App. P. 90(e). Furthermore, the decision is subject to
reconsideration. Though the case may have concluded long before, the court retains plenary
power to order publication unless the court of last resort has acted on a request for review.
Even then, the high court itself may order belated publication. E.g., Meuth v. Hartgrove, 811
S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied) (ordered published in 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
610 (June 5, 1991)).
19. See Alamo Motor Lines v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 229 S.W.2d 112, 117
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, no writ) (refusing request for nonpublication by losing
litigant, reasoning that court could not prevent private publisher from disseminating decision).
20. See TEX. R. App. P. 90(h) (providing for publication upon grant or refusal of application for writ of error or upon denial or dismissal of application for writ of error).
21. State ex rel. McWilliams v. Town of Oak Point, 579 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex. 1979).
22. See generally Ted Z. Robertson & James W. Paulsen, Rethinking the Texas Writ of
ErrorSystem, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 1-25 (1986) (distinguishing various writ designations).
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from the goats. 23 Rule 90(d) creates a presumption against publication which is rebuttable by demonstrating that the case involves any
one of four factors: (1) establishment of a new rule, alteration of an
existing rule, or application of an existing rule to a novel fact situation
likely to recur; (2) an issue of continuing public interest; (3) criticism
24
of existing law; or (4) resolution of an apparent conflict of authority.
These are hazy boundaries. Consequently, 2 5publication rates vary
widely among the fourteen courts of appeals.
A nonpublication rule necessarily entails some disadvantages.26
Complaints are common whenever opinions are subject to a "do not
publish" order. One frequently finds concern that courts are deliberately burying their work product and suppressing precedent. 27 The
publication decision can be decisive to the fate of a writ application.
For the Texas Supreme Court to have subject matter jurisdiction, an
ordinary cause must fit into one of six statutory pigeonholes. 21 The
last of these, called subdivision six jurisdiction, is a catch-all category.
It applies when the court of appeals has committed an error of law "of
such importance to the jurisprudence of the state that, in the opinion
of the supreme court, it requires correction. ' 29 This is pretty elastic.
A question arises. Although one can easily see how a published opinion may affect the jurisprudence of the state, and thus fall within subdivision six, how can an unpublished opinion ever do so? After all,
Rule 90(i) forbids its citation as authority.

23. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Supreme Court Rules for the
Reporting of Opinions: A Critique,46 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 324 (1985) (commenting on need for
standards).
24. TEX. R. APP. P. 90(d).
25. See, e.g., Justice Raul A. Gonzalez, Courts of Appeals Opinions Published/Not Published for Years Ending August 31, 1989 and August 31, 1990, in 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE W-1 (1990). For fiscal year 1990, the state-wide average
was 26% publication, while the Waco court published 8% and the Beaumont court published
45%. Id. For fiscal year 1989, the statewide average was 28% publication, while the Waco
court published 8% and the Beaumont court published 66%. Id.
26. See Robert L. Black, Jr., Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U.
CIN. L. REV. 477, 477-78 (1981) (noting that although many appeals deserve publication,
production of opinions is costly).
27. See Chief Justice Paul W. Nye, The Unpublished Opinion Controversy (The Great
Judicial Coverup), in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED APPELLATE PRACTICE W-1, W-2-3
(1990) (noting that unpublished opinion does not represent subtle shift in law that cannot be
applied by legal community).
28. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.001(a) (Vernon 1988).
29. Id. § 22.001(a)(6).
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OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Enduring concerns about restricted publication are not unique to
Texas. They exist in every jurisdiction that has moved to limit the
production of precedent. The reasons for this relate to the nature of
common law adjudication.
A.

England

The history of English law reports is commonly divided into three
periods. 3° The first is the period of the Year Books (1272-1537).
These reports are not so much judicial opinions as they are pleading
forms. The second period is that of the private law reports (15371865). A vacuum was created by the cessation of the Year Books and
private reporters quickly took up the task of publishing precedents.
This was a great step forward. Because some reporters, such as Coke,
were also judges, it is not surprising that the quality of their work is
still highly regarded today. Eventually, these compilations could be
obtained contemporaneously with the court's decisions. The third period is that of the modern law reports (1865-present). These reports
are the product of the legal profession itself, not of the state. That is,
barristers have assumed responsibility for publishing court decisions.
The relevance of these changes in reporting cases becomes clear
when one recognizes the relationship between adjudication and publication. Without law reports, stare decisis would be a meaningless
doctrine. An English authority describes the link between stare decisis and opinion publication:
The operation of the doctrine of precedent is inextricably bound up
with law reporting. The rule is that any decision may be cited to a
court provided that it is vouched for by a member of the Bar who was
present when judgment was delivered. In addition, since judges may
take judicial notice of the whole of English law, an individual judge may
rely upon a precedent of which he is aware even though the decision is
unreported. There is, thus, no rule that a case may only be cited or
relied upon as a precedent if it is reported. Nevertheless personal recollection by judges or counsel is so impermanent and haphazard that it
could not possibly form the basis of a workable system. Hence prece30.

RONALD JACK WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM

154-61 (6th ed. 1985);

203-04 (2d ed. 1985). It has been suggested
that the idea of relying on precedent originated in the personal note-taking of Judge Henry
Bracton. ALFRED THOMPSON DENNING, WHAT NEXT IN THE LAW? 5-6 (1982).
MICHAEL ZANDER, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS
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dents are almost always contained in law reports. The close nexus between law reporting and the modern doctrine of binding precedent was
formulated only when an integrated system of law reporting evolved in
the nineteenth century.3 1
The English policy still requires that the reporting barrister must have
been present in court when judgment was announced. Under this
voucher rule, one cannot simply cite a case purely on the basis of its
publication.3 2 But by the same token, an unreported decision may be
cited if a member of the bar has vouched for it.33
By 1978, a burgeoning body of case law was causing difficulties.34
Then came Lexis. This computerized data storage service arrived in
Britain in 1980. 3 ' Lawyers were quick to use it, and the Law Lords
were quick to react. Lord Diplock, a respected jurist, delivered the
following remarks in which he disapproved the free citation of unreported precedents:
My Lords, in my opinion, the time has come when your Lordships
should adopt the practice of declining to allow transcripts of unreported
judgments of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal to be cited on
the hearing of appeals to this House unless leave is given to do so, and
that such leave should only be granted on counsel's giving an assurance
that the transcript contains a statement of some principle of law, relevant to an issue in the appeal to this House, that is binding on the Court
of Appeal and of which the substance, as distinct from the mere choice
of phraseology, is not36to be found in one of the generalized or specialized series of reports.

31. RONALD JACK WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 132 (6th ed. 1985) (footnote

omitted).
32. ALFRED KENNETH KIRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 80 (7th ed. 1984); see
also RONALD JACK WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 154 (stating that "even at the

present day, a precedent is not citable merely because it is reported but only if it is vouched for
by a barrister who was present when judgment was delivered").
33. Willson v. Greene, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 635, 638.
34. R.J.C. Munday, New Dimensions of Precedent,J. Soc. PUB. TEACHERS OF LAW 201
(1978).
35. MICHAEL ZANDER, THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 217 (2d ed. 1985).
36. Roberts Petroleum, Ltd. v. Bernard Kenny, Ltd., [1983] 2 A.C. 192, 202, [1983] 1 All
E.R. 564, 567-68. Lord Diplock's pronouncement was foreshadowed by his comments during
the previous year when he complained of increasing americanization of English appellate practice. In M. V Yorke Motors v. Edwards, [1982] 1 All E.R. 1024, he criticized a lawyer's 39-1/2
page written submission as being six times longer than the opponent's filing:
My Lords, I have thought it right to make these observations in the instant appeal
because it provides, in the case lodged by appellant, an example of the spread of the
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Lord Diplock mentioned Lexis by name and noted its growing impact
on the appellate process. He described two classes of law reports,
general and specialized. The latter comprised the modem collections
of precedents classified by subject matter, such as taxation or criminal
law. He concluded that a case which failed to be included in the specialized reports must be necessarily unimportant. The four other Law
Lords hearing the appeal expressly agreed. 37 This growth of specialized law reports is a phenomenon which is not confined to Britain.
B.

Federal Courts

Several features of the English system failed to take root in the
United States. An obvious example of this failure to take root is the
absence of a bifurcated legal profession. American courts therefore
cannot demand the endorsement of an attending barrister to legitimize a law report. But one can see vestiges of the English scheme in
the United States Supreme Court's early reliance on named reporters
such as Cranch, Wheaton, and Peters. These were lawyers, 38 and
Texas still requires a law license of anyone who serves as official reporter for the supreme court.39
tendency which I have deprecated towards preparing written cases in the style of American "appellate briefs." ...
Id. at 1026. The infraction was aggravated by what his Lordship called a "short" oral argument: a mere one and one-half hours.
37. Three days earlier, the Master of the Rolls, Sir John Donaldson, had expressed similar sentiments in Stanley v. InternationalHarvesterCo. of GreatBritain, Ltd., THE TIMES, Feb.
7, 1983 (C.A. Feb. 2, 1983). For an example of the difficulties caused by reliance on mere
summaries of decision, see Computer Machinery v. Drescher, [1983] 3 All E.R. 153, 157.
The Court of Appeals has since instituted a requirement that advocates lodge a "skeleton
argument" with the court before presenting oral arguments. See Practice Direction, [1990] 1
W.L.R. 794, 795; Practice Direction, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 281, 284. It may well be asked what
impact this will have on the distinctions between English and American appellate practice.
38. William Cranch had been a Federalist judge on the Circuit Court of the District of
Columbia. Henry Wheaton became the Supreme Court's first official reporter in 1816. Wheaton served as co-counsel with Daniel Webster in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,
213 (1827). Wheaton was followed by Richard Peters, whose tenure was marked by controversy. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.(8 Pet.) 591 (1834) was a copyright dispute over the rights to
the Supreme Court's opinions. In 1834 the Supreme Court abruptly sacked Peters and replaced him with General Benjamin Howard, largely because of dubious performance in publishing opinions. See I CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 785-86 (rev. ed. 1935) (noting pessimism pervading American legal system about
publishing opinions).
39. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 22.008(a) (Vernon 1988) (stating, "The supreme court
shall appoint one or more licensed attorneys to serve at the will of the court and to report the
decisions of the supreme court"). But the reporter for the court of criminal appeals, on the
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A more subtle distinction between American and English practice
is the way in which judges do their work. Whereas the bureaucratization of judging is not the norm in Britain, American federal courts
have come to rely increasingly on law clerks. One prominent federal

judge has bluntly confessed that "most judicial opinions nowadays are
drafted by law clerks." 4 Each United States Supreme Court Justice
is entitled to have four clerks, and most do. However, only
a century
41
clerks.
law
from
assistance
no
"virtually
ago they had
The general rule in federal courts of appeals is that unpublished
opinions have no precedential effect.4 2 And every federal appellate

court except the Supreme Court43 designates some of its opinions as
unpublished.' There is, nevertheless, a wide range of views among
the courts as to how they value an unpublished opinion as prece-

dent.45 In the Fifth Circuit, for example, an unpublished opinion is

other hand, need not be a lawyer though whoever holds that office may be removed "for inefficiency or neglect of duty." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.104(a) (Vernon 1988).
40. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 190 (1990). See generally
JOHN B. OAKLEY & ROBERT S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10-

35 (1980) (reporting on history of law clerks in America); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 102-19 (1985) (commenting on rise of law clerks).
41. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: Past and Present, 59 A.B.A. J. 361, 362
(1973); accord WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 260 (1987); see also DAVID
M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER 124-35 (1986) (tracing high court's use of law clerks back to
Justice Horace Gray in 1882).
42. See RICHARDSON R. LYNN, APPELLATE LITIGATION § 2.16 at 56 (1985); William L.
Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publicationin the United States
Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 581-82 (1981). But see Smith
v. United States, - U.S. _. n.*, 112 S. Ct. 667, 669 n.*, 116 L. Ed. 2d 758, 760 n.* (1991)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating, "The fact that the Court of Appeals' opinion is unpublished is irrelevant. Nonpublication must not be a convenient means to
prevent review. An unpublished opinion may have a lingering effect in the circuit and surely is
as important to the parties concerned as is a published opinion").
43. See SuP. CT. R. 41 (stating that Reporter of Decisions "shall" prepare court's opinions for publication).
44. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Court of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 940 & n. l
(1989) (citing rules); see also 2 JOHN W. COOLEY, APPELLATE ADVOCACY MANUAL § 22:05
(1989 & Supp. 1991) (commenting on publication practices of federal appellate courts). Ironically, the Tenth Circuit recently supplemented its 1986 no citation rule by publishing a six year
old, previously unpublished dissent to its adoption. In re Rules of United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 955 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1992) (Holloway, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
45. See George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of UnpublishedJudicial Opinions, 39
MERCER L. REV. 477, 480 (1988).
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precedent. 46 As a result, that court must sit en banc in order to resolve a conflict between published and unpublished decisions.47
Consensus on the matter of restricted publication has not yet been
achieved. It may never be. Criticism is easy, as the costs of any such
scheme are plain to see.48
C. Sister States

If federal restrictions have caused misgivings, state nonpublication
plans have provoked outrage. There is a growing body of scholarship
devoted to state nonpublication regimes. Understandably, the scholarship is almost uniformly hostile. One would expect legal scholars to
fill law journals with articles opposing any limits on jurisprudential
output. However, judges have different interests, and since they write
the rules of court, one would expect those rules to reflect an approach
different from those advocated in the typical law review.49
As of 1981, only sixteen states operated under a nonpublication regime.50 Some are more severe than others. The most controversial is
found in California. 5 The California Supreme Court has the extraordinary authority to "decertify" an intermediate court opinion
which would otherwise be published. This power allows the high
46. Atwood v. Union Carbide Corp., 847 F.2d 278, 280 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1079 (1989); United States v. Don B. Hart Equity Pure Trust, 818 F.2d 1246, 1250
(5th Cir. 1987); see 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3 (stating, "Unpublished opinions are precedent").
47. E.g., Nicklos Drilling Co. v. Cowart, 927 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (overruling Kahny v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 729 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.
1984)).
48. See Pamela Fd, Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's
Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 309, 309 (1977) (distinguishing between important
and unimportant cases is at odds with common law system); see also 7TH CIR. R. 28(e) (requiring copy of any unpublished opinion at end of brief).
49. Eg., Robert L. Black, Jr., Unveiling Ohio's Hidden Court, 16 AKRON L. REV. 107
(1982); Robert L. Black, Jr., Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CIN.
L. REV. 477 (1981); Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publicationof Opinions: One Judge's View,
35 AM. U. L. REV. 909 (1986); George Rose Smith, The Selective Publicationof Opinions: One
Court's Experience, 32 ARK. L. REV. 26 (1978).
50. Robert L. Black, Jr., Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U.
CIN. L. REV. 477, 478 n.4 (1981).
51. E.g., Julie Hayward Briggs, Censoring the Law in California: Decertification Revisited, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1577 (1979); Joseph R. Grodin, The DepublicationPracticeof the California Supreme Court, 72 CAL. L. REV. 514 (1984); Robert A. Seligson & John S. Warnlof,
The Use of UnreportedCases in California,24 HASTINGS L.J. 37 (1972). The controversy has
attracted attention even in Texas. See Prappas v. Meyerland Comm. Impr. Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d
794, 799 & n.4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (commenting on California practice).
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court to mold the state's jurisprudence more directly than the ordinary adjudicative process would permit. The prospect of the court's
relinquishing that power has been described as "not likely." 52
Ohio's plan has been the subject of several studies." Adopted in
1983, it had to deal with a peculiarity of local practice, namely that
the intermediate appellate courts published only three percent of their
opinions, leaving in limbo the balance of judicial work product emanating from the courts of appeals. A number of unofficial reports
sprang up and unpublished opinions became a de facto part of Ohio
common law. Whether the new plan has succeeded depends upon
one's definition of success. Unreported decisions are now citable as
"persuasive" but not "controlling" authority within the judicial district in which the opinion was rendered, except between the parties to
the case.54
There is no need to examine each state's approach to limiting the
publication of opinions. It is enough to say that certain features are
common to all schemes. Assuming that an appellate court must produce an opinion at all, any limiting apparatus must deal with several
issues. First, should publication be the rule or the exception? Second,
what are the standards for deciding whether to publish an opinion?
Third, who makes the decision, and finally, what is the status of an
unpublished opinion?
III.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 90(i)

The Winding Path of the Law

There is something of a link between law and political change. It is
therefore understandable that Texas legal history reveals marked discontinuities. As Justice Norvell put it, "[T]he common law of Texas
is somewhat unique in origin and its development has not in all re52. RICHARDSON R. LYNN, APPELLATE LITIGATION § 2.16, at 56 (1985).
53. E.g., Robert L. Black, Jr., Unveiling Ohio's Hidden Court, 16 AKRON L. REV. 107
(1982); Robert L. Black, Jr., Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CIN.
L. REV. 477 (1981); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules
for the Reporting of Opinions: A Critique,46 OHIO ST. L.J. 313 (1985); Gerald W. Shaw, The
Legal Significance of Unpublished Court of Appeals Opinions in Ohio, 6 CAP. U. L. REV. 393
(1977).
54. OHIO SUP. CT. R. REP. Ops. 2(G)(1) & (2); see also William M. Reynolds & William
L. Richman, The Supreme Court Rules of the Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 329 n. 110 (1985) (discussing scope of Ohio rule).
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spects coincided with the general course of evolution discernable
throughout the other American states.""5 The tidal forces of politics
inevitably reshape the law, both in its doctrines and in its institutions.
Doctrinally, after a short struggle the common law triumphed over
the civil law tradition still extant in Mexico and Louisiana.5 6 Even
now, Texas courts look to the common law of England, as construed
by sister states on January 20, 1840,-" for the rule of decision in omitted cases.5 8 It arrived "by adoption rather than by inheritance."5 9
How would the personality of Texas common law differ had its arrival
more closely resembled the pattern in other states? One can only
speculate. 6°
Institutionally, the court system has undergone several restructurings. With each modification of the judicial architecture, the rules of
precedent have also changed. One of the first major changes took
place in 1891 with the establishment of an intermediate court to hear
civil cases. 6 ' Commissions of Appeals have been twice created and

twice abolished. Consequently, determining the precedential weight
of their decisions can be one of the more challenging aspects of practicing law in Texas.6 2 The most recent reordering occurred in 1981

55. Southern Pac. Co. v. Porter, 160 Tex. 329, 334-35, 331 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1960); see also
1 JOHN SAYLES, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE 9 (3d ed. 1896) (stating, "Our legislature, our system
of procedure, the very organization and functions of our courts, are all peculiar").
56. See Robert N. Jones, A JurisprudenceBetter Understood The Adoption of the Com-

mon Law in Texas, 53 TEX. B.J. 452, 452-53 (1990) (noting common law's displacement of
civil law).
57. Southern Pac. Co., 160 Tex. at 334, 331 S.W.2d at 45.
58. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (Vernon 1986) (stating, "The rule of

decision in this state consists of those portions of the common law of England that are not
inconsistent with the constitution or the laws of this state, the constitution of this state, and the
laws of this state").
59. Southern Pac. Co., 160 Tex. at 334, 331 S.W.2d at 45.

60. To this day one can discern strains of nineteenth century populism in the state's jurisprudence. E.g., Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 362 (Tex. 1987) (Mauzy,
J., concurring) (writing, "The people, speaking through the elective process, have constituted a

new majority of this court which has not only the power but the duty to correct the incorrect
conclusion arrived at by the then-majority in 1985 on this question").
61. See A REFERENCE GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 27-29 (Karl T.

Gruben & James E. Hambleton, eds., 2d ed. 1987) (surveying growth in state's judicature).
62. For example, Justice Greenhill explained a minor wrinkle in the writ histories of the
1917 term:
In 1917 when the Supreme Court was far behind on its docket, the Legislature authorized the court to appoint three justices of the Court of Civil Appeals to act on such application for writ of error as were referred to them. (Articles 1748-1754.) But the statute
provided that the refusal or dismissal of such "referred" applications "shall not be re-
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when the courts of civil appeals assumed jurisdiction in noncapital

criminal cases. What had been a burden for the Texas Court of Crim-

inal Appeals became a burden for fourteen intermediate tribunals.6 3
Though the legislature has enlarged the intermediate court bench,
caseloads continue to grow and as a result the number of opinions
continues to grow. Today, the need for a nonpublication scheme is

even more acute. 64
Intermediate appellate courts became early accomplices in the production of unpublished opinions. With the passage of time, these de-

cisions are of more interest when considered in a historical rather
than legal context. However, it is worth pausing to consider their

fate.
B.

Before the 1941 Rules

The history of Texas law reports has been fairly well examined. 65
The evolution of publication practices is somewhat more obscure.
When West Publishing began the first volume of the Southwestern
Reports, commencing with cases decided in August 1886, a class of
unpublished opinions already existed. Posey stepped into the gap
with the first of two volumes of hitherto unreported cases.6 6 Others
garded as a precedent or authority." This procedure was used by the Supreme Court
from April 1917, through the end of its term in June 1918. When the Commission of
Appeals was established and began its deliberations in October 1918, the practice was
discontinued. But a writ marked "Refused" during the 1917-1918 period may or may not
be an authority, depending on whether it was "referred." A list containing many of the
referred cases is set out in 108 Tex. 591-648.
Justice Joe Greenhill, Uniform Citationsfor Briefs with Observations on the Meanings of the
Stamps or Markings Used in Denying Writs of Error,in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, APPELLATE
PROCEDURE IN TEXAS, § A.1[3], at A-13-14 (1964). Similarly, McCormick has noted the
pointlessness of publishing certain decisions by the Commission of Appeals where the Supreme
Court declined to adopt the opinions. A statute in effect at that time provided that those
opinions were to have no precedential force whatsoever. See C.T. McCormick, Stemming the
Tide of Judicial Opinions, I TEX. L. REV. 450, 453 (1923).
63. See Clarence Guittard, The Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals, 14 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 549, 553-54 (1983) (discussing increased caseload for 14 courts of appeals).
64. See Jim Brady, Reducing Appellate Delay-A "Fast Track" System, 17 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 179, 180 (1986) (noting increasing numbers and delay).
65. Eg., A REFERENCE GUIDE TO TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY (Karl T. Gruben
& James E. Hambleton, eds., 2d ed. 1987); James Hambleton & Jim Paulsen, The "Official"
Texas Court Reports: The Rest of the Story, 49 TEX. B.J. 842 (1986); Jim Paulsen & James
Hambleton, Confederates and Carpetbaggers: The Precedential Value of Decisionsfrom the
Civil War and Reconstruction Era, 51 TEX. B.J. 916 (1988); Jim Paulsen & James Hambleton,
The "Official" Texas Court Reports: Birth, Death and Resurrection, 49 TEX. B.J. 82 (1986).
66. 1 S.A. POSEY, TEXAS UNREPORTED CASES (1886).
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followed suit.67 The courts' regard for these cases remains unclear.
There is no doubt that judges occasionally encountered unpublished opinions. For example, in an 1892 opinion, the supreme court

noted that the trial court had felt bound by the unpublished opinion
of Wallace v. City of Dallas in 1884, "a case to which we do not now
have access." '68 Likewise, an 1894 supreme court case refers to the
lower court's opinion as one which "seems not to have been officially
published. ' 69 It appears that judges themselves controlled the determination of whether to publish.7° Their method of determination is
not certain.
C.

After the 1941 Rules

Although Texas appellate rules had no separate identity until 1986,
many of them existed earlier as rules of civil procedure. When it
came to opinion protocol, the mainstay of the 1941 rules was Rule
452:
Opinions of the Courts of Civil Appeals shall be as brief as practicable, and shall avoid as far as possible lengthy quotations from other

decisions or texts; and where the issues involved have been clearly settled by authority or elementary principles of law, the court shall write
only brief memorandum opinions. Opinions shall be ordered not published when they present no question or application of any rule of law of
interest or importance to the jurisprudence of the State. 7
67. E.g., 1 EDMUND SAMSON GREEN, DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS OF THE APPELLATE
COURTS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS (1904). The Preface begins with an ambitious claim: "This
is a complete digest of all the decisions, civil and criminal, of the appellate courts of Texas
from the earliest times to the decisions reported in volume 75 of the Southwestern Reporter."
Id. at iii.
68. Cooper v. City of Dallas, 83 Tex. 239, 241, 18 S.W. 565, 565 (1892). Although the
Wallace decision surfaced in Posey's Unreported Cases, its presence there did not lead to acceptance as legitimate. See City of Wichita Falls v. Mauldin, 39 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1931, judgm't adopted) (stating that Wallace was "not regarded as authority by
the Supreme Court of this state").
69. Compton v. Marshall, 88 Tex. 50, 50, 27 S.W. 121, 121 (1894).
70. See, e.g., Huff v. Crawford, 88 Tex. 368, 368, 31 S.W. 614, 614 (1895) (supplemental
opinion "ordered" published); Stevens' Ex'rs v. Lee, 70 Tex. 279, 279, 8 S.W. 40, 41 (1888)
(appeal of retrial where original reversal announced in unpublished opinions). Another case
cites a dissent that had appeared in Southwestern Reporter but not in the official law reports.
Bell v. Faulkner, 84 Tex. 187, 191, 19 S.W. 480, 481 (1892) (separate statement of Henry, J.)
(referring to Davis v. State, 75 Tex. 420, 433, 12 S.W. 957, 962 (1889) (Henry, J.,dissenting)).
71. TEX. R. Civ. P. 452 (Vernon 1941) (repealed 1986). For contemporaneous commentary, see Clyde Emery, Overload of Law Books: How Can We Reduce It?, 5 TEX. B.J. 77, 78
(1942) (discussing dearth of published material); Clyde Emery, Opinion-Writing Reform is Be-
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An amendment was made in 1943 to provide for automatic publication whenever the supreme court should order a writ either granted or
unqualifiedly refused. That feature did not survive the next revision
in 1982. In the 1982 revision, more properly called a replacement, the
automatic publication provision gave way to a discretionary power.
Consequently, the supreme court could order publication in a case it
had granted or refused writ, although it rarely did so.
In 1986, Rule 452 was redesignated as Appellate Rule 90. The automatic publication clause was restored in the 1990 amendment process. The texts of Rule 452(0 and Rule 90(i) are precisely the same:
"Unpublished opinions shall not be cited as authority by counsel or
by a court." Because Rule 452(0 had no predecessor, it has taken a
decade to discover its contours.

IV.

APPELLATE RULE 90(i)

Implicit in the concept of an unpublished opinion is a restriction on
its availability as precedent. It makes no sense to suppress a decision
which is to have meaning for purposes of stare decisis. The Fifth Circuit's contrary practice must be seen as anomalous. A noncitation
rule follows as a logical consequence of a nonpublication rule. It is
generally said, therefore, that unreported cases carry no weight.7 2 But
the scope of such a rule is far from self-evident. In what forums does
the rule apply? What does it mean to cite a case "as authority?"
When is a case not a case? These issues are explored below.
A.

"Unpublished... "

Despite Rule 90's insistence that each opinion carry the notation
"publish" or "do not publish," life is not so simple.
1. Ordered Published but Not Yet Reported
There is an inevitable time lag between the official issuance of an
opinion and the date of its appearance in the advance sheets. The
gun, 5 TEX. B.J. 79, 79-80 (1942) (noting trend toward reducing number of reported opinions);
Towne Young, Our Courts of Civil Appeals, 3 TEX. B.J. 101, 111 (1940) (suggesting methods
whereby appeals process may be improved).
72. Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983); Wheeler v. Aldama-Luebbert, 707
S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Nava v. Steubing, 700
S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ); Mid-Continent Supply Co. v. Clements, 676 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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primary reason for delay is the need to await disposition of any motions for rehearing. This does not normally pose a problem. Any
member of the public may procure a copy of the slip opinion from the
court clerk and a commercial service reproduces each week's slip
opinions designated for publication by the fourteen courts of appeals.
Criminal practitioners should exercise caution. There is authority
for the proposition that a decision is "not final and not part of the
jurisprudence of this State" if a motion for rehearing is pending."
That statement of law is quite wrong. It is traceable to a 1978 criminal case, Komurke v. State.74 Komurke's trial took place during an
interlude between original issuance of an opinion in Bishoff v. State
and its replacement by a different opinion on rehearing."
On appeal, Komurke challenged his conviction as a violation of ex
post facto prohibitions, pointing to the withdrawal of the original
opinion in Bishoff. The court of criminal appeals rejected his claim
with the unfortunate words, "the opinion on original submission was
never final and never was a part of the jurisprudence of this State."7' 6
Over time, this holding has mutated into a more general formulation.
Whether the mutation will spread and whether it will infect civil cases
cannot be predicted. Civil jurisprudence may have been adequately
inoculated by a supreme court holding that trial court judgments are
"final" for purposes of preclusion despite the taking of an appeal.77
Given the newly restored provision for automatic publication in
certain instances, what does one do with an opinion that ought to be
published by operation of law, yet has not been? Suppose, for example, that a court of appeals disposes of a case with an unpublished

73. Canida v. State, 823 S.W.2d 382, 383 n.2 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no pet.);
Henderson v. State, 822 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, no pet.);
Vasquez v. State, 814 S.W.2d 773, 776 n.I (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd);
Brown v. State, 807 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.); see
Yeager v. State, 727 S.W.2d 280, 281 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (cautioning against reliance
on "non-final" decisions).
74. 562 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
75. Bishoff v. State, 531 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
76. Komurke, 562 S.W.2d at 235.
77. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1986). Pre-Smithwick authority held that a decision is not "final" for purposes of creating conflict jurisdiction until it is no
longer subject to modification on rehearing. Barber v. Intercoast Jobbers & Brokers, 417
S.W.2d 154, 156-157 (Tex. 1967). Whether that rule survived Smithwick is unclear. The question is no longer significant, however, because the supreme court now has more or less plenary
discretion to grant appellate review, even in the absence of a conflict. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 22.001(a) (6) (Vernon 1988).
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decision but the supreme court grants the writ and summarily
reverses. Rule 90 indicates that the unpublished decision is to be released "forthwith" by the clerk of the intermediate court. It remains
to be seen whether court clerks are quick to abide by this requirement.78 May a lawyer cite the formerly unpublished decision as a
matter of right, as soon as the supreme court issues its decision?7 9 We
do not know. Though one might well ask why counsel would want to
cite a reversed case at all, the possibility exists that the supreme court
might have reversed only a part of the case and left intact another
portion.
2.

Ordered Published but Removed to Federal Court

Delayed removal to the federal system is uncommon but not unknown. It typically occurs because some particular federal interest
becomes implicated. Predictably, examples of this have involved financial institutions. In Crain v. San JacintoSavings Ass'n,8 ° the court
of appeals ordered its opinion published and the supreme court
granted review. Although the high court heard oral arguments, it had
not issued a decision when the case was removed to federal court.
In MBank Abilene v. LeMaire,81 federal authorities took over the
appellant bank. The case became removable and it departed from the
state court after issuance of an original opinion, ordered published,
but before the motions for rehearing were decided. The better view
would appear to be that the case has the dignity of published status.
One presumes the federal proceeding will eventually end. The fact
that the court which issued the MBank opinion is directly tied into a
computer data service, unlike a typical state court of appeals, exacerbates the problem. Thus, the opinion, though readily available, is not
in the ordinary law books because the state court never ruled on the
motions for rehearing. Rule 90 does not discuss the effect of "publication" in a data bank. Nor does it discuss the more general issue of
publication in secondary sources.
78. Mandamus relief might be available in theory. See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795
S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. 1990, orig. proceeding) (filing mandamus against clerk of court of
appeals).
79. E.g., Tricentrol Oil Trading, Inc. v. Annesley, 809 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1991), rev'g, No.
A14-89-811-CV, 1990 WL 113747 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 1990).
80. 781 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ granted).
81. No. C14-86-834-CV, 1989 WL 30995 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 6,
1989).
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Published Where? Secondary Authority

West Publishing Company is not the only publication service. Specialized reports also have wide circulation. The lone court to discuss
the problems created by specialized reporting services has construed
Rule 90(i) as permitting citation to an Oklahoma intermediate court
opinion published only in a secondary service, the U.C.C. Reporter.82
This outcome is sensible. Specialization is a growing trend within the
bar8 3 and it is natural that practitioners would rely on specialized authorities. One cannot settle the issue simply by looking to the text of
the rule.
There are many arguments in favor of recognizing secondary authority. First, society should encourage litigants to seek specialized
counsel because the quality of representation will improve. Second,
since both sides to a dispute can have such representation, no one will
be blind-sided by an undiscovered opinion because each lawyer will
have access to the relevant reporting service. Third, market forces
will regulate the segregation between important and unimportant
court decisions. If a case fails to catch the eye of an expert editor, it
must not deserve dissemination.
Arguments against secondary authority are obvious. First, the appellate rules empower judges, not private practitioners, to decide what
is published. It would evade Rule 90 to let anyone with a printing
press make the ultimate decision whether an opinion should be published. Second, while judges are neutral arbiters who will distinguish
the wheat from the chaff more accurately, the so-called specialists
have an incentive to see every opinion reported. Third, not all law
libraries are identical. Generalists regularly litigate against specialists. It is common for only one of the lawyers to subscribe to a special
service, and few courts subscribe to many of them.
An interesting aspect of the specialization phenomenon is its appearance within the government. Not only are there specialized government litigators, but also specialized courts, even at the appellate
level. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is the nation's leading expositor of administrative law.
82. Allegheny Int'l Credit Corp. v. Segal, 735 S.W.2d 552, 554 n.3 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ).
83. See J.Myron Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control and Publicationof Appellate
Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REV. 791, 795-96 (1975) (noting effect of specialization on legal
publishing industry).
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What the District of Columbia Circuit does for federal administrative
law, the Austin Court of Appeals does for Texas administrative law.
This is significant because the lawyers and agencies subject to oversight by a particular tribunal are likely to study even the Austin Court
of Appeals' unpublished decisions. Life in a regulatory state could
not be otherwise. For example, the Tax Division of the Justice Department collects unpublished district court decisions in tax cases.
After refusing to make that material public, the Department was hit
by the inevitable lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. The
Department lost."4 A recent study suggests the presence of a similar
phenomenon in United States Attorneys' offices around the country. 85
4. Published but Withdrawn
86
According to the general rule, withdrawn opinions have no value.
Only rarely does it matter. Withdrawal of an opinion is ordinarily
used to correct a minor error: perhaps a spelling mistake; omission of
some peripheral fact; or an incorrect citation. The court will issue a
second opinion announcing the withdrawal and replacement of the
first. One must usually apply considerable scrutiny to find the
alterations.
There are exceptions. A mootness problem, for example, may go
unnoticed until after decision, in which case the court will have to
withdraw the opinion already having tipped its hand as to which side
was most persuasive. Something like this occurred in E.. Hutton &
Co. v. Youngblood, 7 where the supreme court wrote an important
opinion explaining whether a securities law violation is covered by the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act."8 That opinion was later withdrawn.89 When the issue resurfaced in another case, one of the litigants predictably cited the supreme court's retracted opinion as
authority. Less predictably, the court of appeals refused to follow the

84. United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989).
85. Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989).
86. Park v. Essa Tex. Corp., 158 Tex. 269, 273 n.2, 311 S.W.2d 228, 231 n.2 (1958);
Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 235, 239-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana

1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 508 (June 24, 1987), withdrawn, 741 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. 1987).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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retracted opinion's holding and the supreme court denied review. 9°
In its opinion, the court of appeals cited Rule 90(i) for the proposition
that an unpublished opinion is of no precedential value. 9 1

No rule formally authorizes a court to withdraw an opinion. The
power to do so may be justified as implied by the rule that demands
production of an opinion in every case, or as a tacit component of the
rehearing process. 92 More intriguing is the supreme court's power to
order withdrawal of a court of appeals' opinion. Plainly, the Texas
Supreme Court cannot "decertify" a lower court opinion as can the
California Supreme Court. When a court of appeals orders an opinion published, that does not prevent the parties from seeking supreme
court review. If the litigants settle the case while the writ application
is pending, the customary course is for them to file a joint motion to
dismiss. In that event, the supreme court grants the motion and dismisses the writ. The lower court's opinion survives, forever to be
cited as "writ dism'd by agr."
Yet, suppose part of the settlement agreement called not only for
vacating the intermediate court's judgment but also its opinion. This
occurred when the Tyler court issued an opinion in the mandamus
proceeding styled Cherokee Steel Fabricators,Inc. v. Khoury,93 and
the losing party sought high court review in Matthews v. Twelfth
Court of Appeals.94 The case was settled, and to effectuate the settlement the supreme court ordered the appellate court's judgment and
opinion "set aside." By what right? The supreme court's summary
90. Frizzell v. Cook, 790 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).

91. Id.
92. See Terrazas v. Ramirez, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 308, 315 (Jan. 15, 1992) (Mauzy, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "this court typically corrects its error on rehearing by withdrawing its
original opinion and substituting a new one").
93. 733 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, orig. proceeding).
94. 742 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. 1987, orig. proceeding). The preferred citation form for this
opinion is open to debate. Chapter 8 of the latest edition of the Greenbook promulgates a rule
for citing mandamus cases. See TEXAS RULES OF FORM 18 (7th ed. 1990). In response to the

so-called mandamus explosion, the Greenbook calls for supreme court mandamus decisions to
be cited with the irrelevant phrase "orig. proceeding" as part of the parenthetical. Id. But the

"orig. proceeding" tag has meaning only at the court of appeals level. To omit "orig. proceed-

ing" from an intermediate court case would leave the reader unaware of the case's writ history

and unable to assign the case a precedential value. Supreme court cases do not have writ
histories. Supreme court opinions are neither more nor less binding merely because they arise
in a mandamus context. It makes no difference. All supreme court cases are intrinsically
authoritative for the propositions they declare. For this reason, the Greenbook requirement of
"orig. proceeding" should be abandoned at the next revision.
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order nowhere justifies the command to "set aside" a lower court's
opinion. This is particularly odd in view of the high court's failure to
make a similar disposition of other causes that settled, causes decided
in the same period of time.9 5 And what does it mean? The Tyler
court's opinion was, and still is, available in the printed volumes of
the reporter.
Perhaps the court was guilty only of inadvertence. It was surely
guilty of that in a recent instance where the United States Supreme
Court found federal preemption and reversed a holding that had created a new exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. 96 On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme
Court stated that its prior opinion, long since published and bound,9
was "withdrawn."

5. Federalism Problems
When a Texas court must determine the law of another jurisdiction,
there is always the possibility that the other court system evaluates

case law differently from Texas. This problem is particularly acute in
states governed by the Fifth Circuit, since that court has a local rule
that unpublished opinions are binding precedent. Rule 90(i) does not
address this question.
It would seem appropriate to give an unreported decision whatever
dignity it would have in the court that rendered the decision. That is
certainly true where the unpublished case originated in a state court
and a federal court is being asked to follow the decision as a matter of

that state's law. As one court curtly stated, "A noncase for Wiscon-

sin's own purposes is a non-case in federal courts under Erie."98 Like-

95. E.g., Hughes Drilling Fluids, Inc. v. Eubanks, 742 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. 1987) (ordering
only judgments of courts below "set aside"); Lampson v. South Park Indep. School Dist., 742
S.W.2d 275 (Tex. 1987) (same); M & E Food Mart, Inc. # 2 v. Williamson, 742 S.W.2d 276
(Tex. 1987) (same); Barber v. Peoples Say. & Loan Ass'n, 742 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1987) (effectuating settlement without making any mention of judgment or opinion below). In Texas Oil &
Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988), the supreme court set aside the judgment but
not the opinion of the Texarkana Court of Appeals. Yet it has been suggested that the Texarkana court's opinion "is probably of no precedential value." Bado Equip. Co. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 814 S.W.2d 464, 476 n.l (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
96. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, - U.S. ... 111 S.Ct. 478, 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d
474, 488 (1990), rev'g, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989).
97. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991).
98. Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 974, 976 (7th Cir. 1991); accord
Russell v. Atlas Van Lines, 411 F. Supp. 111, 113 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
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wise, where a state statute denies precedential effect to intermediate
court decisions because intermediate courts are too inferior, a federal
court owes no Erie allegiance to them either. 99
In Texas the issue has rarely been discussed. One resourceful advocate tried to rely on an unpublished federal district court opinion
from the Fifth Circuit where unpublished opinions are precedent.
The Dallas Court of Appeals disapproved. In a bit of circular reasoning, the court observed: "Appellant has presented no authority for
the proposition that the unpublished Sanchez opinion has any precedential value. ' ' 10° Absence of discussion, though, does not mean the
question never arises. Take-or-pay litigation is the most fertile setting
because unpublished district court orders compose the bulk of takeor-pay "law." ' '0 In that context, one writer reasoned that even a state
trial court decision would be considered authoritative in a federal diversity setting, 10 2 but the better view is to the contrary. The federal
courts have receded from the wooden approach which briefly held
sway 10 3 and the orthodox rule is now that an unreported state court
case is not dispositive in federal court."°4
99. Graham v. White-Phillips Co., Inc., 296 U.S. 27, 31 (1935). Federal habeas corpus
cases exhibit the interplay between state and federal law. In Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412 (7th
Cir. 1987), the dispute was over a pair of opinions from the state court of appeals, one published and the other unpublished. Those two opinions appeared to disagree on whether "great
bodily harm" was an element of the offense. A majority of the panel effectively held that one
of the cases was "wrong" as a matter of state law. Id. at 428.
100. Ex Parte Rogers, 804 S.W.2d 945, 949 n.4 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, orig.
proceeding).
101. J. Michael Medina, Ethical Concerns in Civil Appellate Advocacy, 43 Sw. L.J. 677,

691 (1989).
102. Id. at 710-11.
103. Eg., Gustin v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 154 F.2d 961, 962-63 (6th Cir.) (ignoring state
practice and adhering to unpublished opinion of Ohio court of appeals), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
866 (1946).
104. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948)
(holding that it would be incongruous to bind federal courts to decisions which would not be
binding on state court); see also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch, 387
U.S. 456, 457 (1967) (rejecting more mechanical view taken by three dissenting justices);
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 58 (4th ed. 1983) (explaining task of determining
what is state's law).
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". ..opinions. .."'
1. An Opinion Is Not a Judgment

There is a difference between an opinion and a judgment. 10 5 An
opinion gives reasons; it says why. A judgment gives orders; it says
what. A commercial publisher prints opinions. It does not print
judgments, for no one would want to read them if it did.
The distinction is worth observing. It is a distinction once ignored
by the Texas Comptroller, unlikely to be ignored again.'0 6 In an unpublished opinion, the Austin Court of Appeals invalidated one of the
Comptroller's rules as unconstitutional. 1o7 The Comptroller chose to
continue operating by the rule, reasoning that the unreported case
was not binding precedent. 0 8 When a second taxpayer brought a successful suit, the Comptroller appealed."° The Austin court was not
amused. First, it affirmed the judgment for the taxpayer, explaining
that the rule against citing an unpublished opinion did not nullify the
0 Then the court held the appeal frivjudgment previously rendered. 11
olous and assessed a $10,000 fine pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 84. 11

What caused the Comptroller's predicament was a confusion between the doctrine of stare decisis and the doctrine of preclusion.
Stare decisis has a universal binding effect, but preclusion operates
only on particular parties. The rule against citing unpublished opinions is a stare decisis rule, not a preclusion rule. Judgments are no
less effective merely because they come with an unpublished opinion.
Indeed, for principles of preclusion to apply, there is no need for any
opinion at all."12

105. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 587 (1933) (holding that court's decision of case is
its judgment thereon, and opinion is statement of reasons on which judgment rests).
106. Bullock v. Sage Energy Co., 728 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
107. Id.at 466 n.1.
108. Id. at 468.
109. Id. at 466.
110. Bullock, 728 S.W.2d at 469.
111. Id.
112. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480 (1982) (state court judgment conclusive even without opinion); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 705
(7th Cir. 1987) (preclusion given to unreasoned "perfunctory" finding); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 & cmt. d (1982).
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An Opinion Is Not a Mandate

The mandate is the official communication of the superior court to
the court upon whose judgment it is acting. It transmits the contents
13
of the judgment.'
3.

There Can Be More Than One Opinion

In theory, Rule 90 contemplates only one opinion. In practice it is
not unusual to encounter more. Because contemporary civil procedure favors the liberal joinder of claims, a routine appeal may involve
dozens of issues. If the court announces only one new rule of law,
with twenty familiar rules recited, must the entire opinion be published? Or if the nugget of new law is embedded in a mountain of
evidence, must all the facts be detailed in the published portion? Rule
90 fails to provide an answer. The courts have taken that silence to
mean that opinion-splitting is acceptable. 1 4 The practice has not
been abused, and any supreme court disapproval is more likely to surface in the rule-making process than in the course of litigation.
4.

Per Curiam Opinions

Per curiam opinions are still opinions. They are therefore subject
to Rule 90. Part (b) gives a majority of the courts of appeals not only
the power to decide about publication but also the power to decide
whether the opinion shall be signed or issued per curiam. The distinction should be one without a difference. Oddly, however, until recently the supreme court prohibited separate opinions when a per
curiam was issued.l"5 No rule required that practice. Courts of ap113. TEX. R. APP. P. 86.
114. E.g., Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983) (noting that unpublished portion of opinion was of no precedential value and should not be cited); Loom Craft Carpet
Mills, Inc. v. Gorrell, 823 S.W.2d 431, 432 & n.6 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, n.w.h.) (separating published from unpublished parts with double brackets); American Speedreading Academy, Inc. v. Holst, 496 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ) (ordering
appendix unpublished). Federal courts do the same. E.g., Dhaliwal v. Woods Div., Hesston
Corp., 930 F.2d 547, 548 (7th Cir. 1991).
115. See Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Southwest, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1017, 1021
(July 1, 1992) (containing signed majority opinion, signed concurrence, and hitherto unknown
unsigned "per curiam concurring opinion"); Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d
38, 43 n. 1 (Tex. 1989) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (noting that supreme court had not allowed
dissents in per curiam opinions). One Justice reports that this custom has been abandoned.
Eugene A. Cook, Texas Supreme Court Practice, in 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED
CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE V-7 (1991).
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peals have not followed suit.1 16
One is entitled to wonder why the supreme court observed that arbitrary practice. The benefits are obscure and the detriments are
plain. It is evident from federal case law that a per curiam opinion is
the most efficient way to announce the judgment of a deeply divided
court. Thus, the Pentagon Papers case accomplished the seemingly
impossible feat of producing ten opinions from a nine member court:
one brief per curiam accompanied by a separate opinion from each
Justice.' 1 7 That phenomenon may be rare at the high court level but
it is frequently found in three-judge panels."' Allowing separate
opinions along with a per curiam would eliminate any confusion over
the scope of the holding. Where is the holding of the court in Mays v.
Fifth Court of Appeals?" 9 It is surely not confined to Justice Ray's
lead opinion. Rather, it must reside in Justice Spears' "concurring"
opinion because four other justices joined in it.' 2 0 What is one to do
with the three opinions emanating from the El Paso Court of Appeals
2
in Olney Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Farmers'Market of Odessa, Inc.?'
What is the holding? Use of a per curiam with separate opinions
would eliminate the confusion or at least reduce it to the level necessarily involved in the interpretation of words.
C.

"

.

. shall not.... "

What is the sanction for citing an unpublished opinion? Rule 90
does not say. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 74, which regulates
the filing of briefs, provides that a court may require a rebriefing but
only for a flagrant violation of "this" rule. The question has not come
22
up with great frequency.'
116. See, e.g., Cohen v. Strake, 743 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]

1988, orig. proceeding) (including dissenting opinions with per curiam opinion).
117. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
118. Eg., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam
with three separate opinions), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
119. 755 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. 1988).

120. Id. at 80.
121. 764 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied). Olney has been read as

having no holding at all on the basis that no rule of law commanded a majority. Georgetown

Assocs., Ltd. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Tex. App.-Houston

[14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
122. In the two supreme court cases that turn on TEX. R. App. P. 74(p), there is no
citation to a single prior decision. Weaver v. Southwest Nat'l Bank, 813 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.
1991); Inpetco, Inc. v. Texas Am. Bank/Houston, N.A., 729 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1987).
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1. Do Nothing
An appellate court might simply ignore the violation. In Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum,

123

one side cited

unpublished authorities in the trial court though there was no indication that the trial court paid any attention. The court of appeals assumed the trial judge ignored the offending materials and affirmed the
judgment.
2.

Impose Sanctions

Unless Rule 90 inspires an adherence more scrupulous than is true
of the typical court rule, it will eventually be violated often enough to
precipitate case law on sanctions. That point cannot be far away.
The Austin Court of Appeals recently served notice on the bar that it
124
is on the lookout for violators.
3. Find Only an Ethics Violation
In a sense, the rule that a party not mention unpublished opinions
is the converse of the ethical requirement that a party must mention
adverse precedent. 12 If suppression of unfavorable authority is unethical, is it also unethical to cite a favorable non-precedent? It is
certainly unethical to commit an intentional violation of any proce26
dural rule. 1
D.

"". . be cited as authority...

This phrase makes up the core of the rule. Yet its meaning is not
self-evident. Followers of the United States Supreme Court would
123. 666 S.W.2d 604, 610 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985).
124. Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 501 & n.3 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991,
no writ).
125. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9 (Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct) Rule 3.03(a)(4) & cmt. 3 (1990) (located in the pocket part for
Volume 3 of the Texas Government Code in title 2, subtitle G. app., following § 83.006 of the
Government Code) (requiring disclosure of unfavorable authority). See generally J.Michael
Medina, Ethical Concerns in Civil Appellate Advocacy, 43 Sw. L.J. 677, 704-13 (1989) (discussing adverse precedent rule).
126. See SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9 (Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure) Rule 3.04 cmt. 3 (1990) (stating that "lawyer in good conscience
should not engage in even a single intentional violation of those rules, however, and a lawyer
may be subject to judicial sanctions for doing so"); see also id. Rule 3.04(c)(1) (stating that
lawyer shall not "habitually violate an established rule of procedure or of evidence").
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know the name but not the holding of United States v. Detroit Timber
and Lumber Co. 127 That case is cited in or along with literally every
opinion issued by the Supreme Court. It is the "headnote" case,
which the reporter of decisions cites in a starred footnote for the proposition that the syllabus constitutes no part of the court's opinion.
1. Where? On Appeal Only or in All Courts? May Counsel
Cite an Unpublished Decision to a Trial Judge?
The terms of Rule 90(i) do not seem to apply. Rule 90 is after all a
rule of appellate procedure and the appellate rules apply only to "appeals." 2s Furthermore, because Rule 90 is found among the provisions that govern proceedings in the courts of appeals, one might infer
an intent not to regulate matters in the courts of last resort. On the
other hand, Rule 90(i) is written in fairly blunt language. The better
view would appear to interpret the rule as applying at all levels. That
is to say, Rule 90 is less concerned with policing counsel's behavior
than with defining what a precedent shall be. It appears among the
intermediate court rules because of (a) virtually universal publication
by the courts of last resort, and (b) virtually universal nonpublication
yet spoken to this issue, as they
by trial courts. Texas courts have 1not
29
years.
few
a
will surely do within
2.

The Meaning of Citation "as authority"

Not every citation is a citation as authority. For example, Rule
90(i) does not forbid reference to an unpublished opinion purely for
the factual background it contains. 30 A court's judgment can have
two basic types of effect: (1) to resolve the dispute, and (2) to advance
127. 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906) (holding that headnotes are written by reporter and are not
work of court).
128. TEX. R. App. P. l(a). TEX. R. App. P. 60(a) authorizes dismissal of an appeal for
failure to comply with "any order of the court." The supreme court has construed this use of
the word "court" to mean appellate courts only, and not trial courts. O'Connor v. Sam Houston Medical Hosp., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. 1991).
129. One court hinted its disapproval of citing an unpublished case in the trial courts.
Medical Protective Co. v. Glanz, 721 S.W.2d 382, 385 n.1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986,
writ ref'd). The precedential value of Glanz is unclear. The supreme court gave the case an
outright refusal of the writ, which is the equivalent of adopting the opinion as that of the
supreme court. But Glanz is not just one opinion. It is three. Each judge wrote separately.
Only the lead opinion touched on the citation question, and merely in passing.
130. See Weldon v. Hill, 678 S.W.2d 268, 271-72 & n.1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (distinguishing citation as authority from citation for other purposes).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss1/2

28

Gunn: Unpublished Opinions Shall Not Be Cited as Authority: The Emergin

1992]

"UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS SHALL NOT BE CITED...

143

the law generally. 31 The former variety involves declaring the law
between the parties. This furnishes the basis for preclusion doctrines
like res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. The latter
variety involves the doctrine of stare decisis. It is in this context that
lawyers commonly speak of a decision's binding force.
The text fails to differentiate between binding authority and persuasive authority. A decision is said to be binding when it must be either
followed or distinguished. Persuasive authority need not be so
respected. An intermediate appellate court opinion is binding on that
court but merely persuasive in coordinate courts of appeals. Thus,
circuit conflicts may arise. It might be argued that since a decision of
one court of appeals is only persuasive authority in the other courts of
appeals, a litigant ought to be able to cite the case. This would be
taking unwarranted liberties, however, to interpolate the word "binding" into the rule. Rule 90(i) would have a narrow sweep indeed if it
only applied to the use of an unpublished opinion in the forum where
it originated. No, the point of the rule is precisely to stop such
practices.

E. ...

"by counsel or a court."

Compliance is not universal. One court relied on an unpublished
opinion not as authority, but merely to "explain" the resolution of the
instant case.'32 Another paid respectful homage to Rule 90 before
violating it 1 33 just the same. And yet another Texas court deferred to
the sister states' own internal treatment of their unpublished opinions
34
before deciding whether to consider the cited unpublished opinion.
131. See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions
and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 941
(1989). But see id. at 947-53 (disputing this simple dichotomy). See also George M. Weaver,
The Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477, 481-83

(1988).
132. Hare v. State, 713 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, pet. ref'd).
133. Gonzales v. State, 672 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no pet.). For a
borderline case, see Jones v. State, 774 S.W.2d 7, 17 n.l (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, pet.
granted) (Baker, J.,dissenting).
134. National Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 829 S.W.2d 322, 326 n.5, 327 n.6 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ granted). The court deferred to Ohio's rule which states that unpublished opinions shall not be considered controlling or persuasive outside the judicial district
that rendered the opinion, and refused to consider their unreported case. Id. at 326 n.5. Similarly, the court followed Tennessee's rule, which allows citation of unpublished opinions provided a copy of the opinion is furnished to the court and to adversary counsel, and considered
an unreported opinion from Tennessee. Id. at 327 n.6.
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For obvious reasons, judges have less incentive than lawyers to break
Rule 90,135 but it is primarily judicial violations that will be preserved
in legal libraries. Law review articles are, of course, exempt from
Rule 90.136
V.

CONCLUSION

Rule 90 strikes a balance between two competing interests. First, it
limits the production of precedent by allowing for unpublished opinions. In so doing, it slows the growth of law libraries and reduces the
availability of those decisions. Second, it bans reliance on unpublished opinions. This prohibition levels the playing field which would
otherwise tilt in favor of the well-financed. If Rule 90 misses its mark,
it has at least good company in other jurisdictions. Texas courts are
not the first to face the problem of restricted publication.
What the future holds cannot be said with certainty. Technology
may provide a "solution" by making even unpublished opinions readily accessible to all. But because an adversary system generates pressure to find all relevant authorities, the cure could be worse than the
disease. Likewise, changes in the appellate process, discretionary jurisdiction for courts of appeals, or abolition of the opinion requirement might be more effective than Rule 90(i). The acceptability of
such changes would depend on one's answer to two questions: what is
justice, and how much justice is enough? Those issues are substantive, not procedural.

135. Trial court proceedings are not exempt from violations. See Robinson v. Bowen,
867 F.2d 600, 600 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that trial court improperly relied on unreported
case, but affirming judgment on independent grounds); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. McCollum, 666 S.W.2d 604, 610 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (presuming trial court ignored citation to unpublished authority), cert. denied, 469 U.S.

1127 (1985).
136. See, e.g., Christopher Griesel, Note, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1017, 1040 n.196
(1987). The article contains an excellent discussion of a lower court's refusal to follow controlling precedent. However, the court of appeals ordered its opinion not to be published and the
supreme court denied review. Oxoco Exploration & Prod. Inc. v. Arrowhead Drilling Corp.,
No. A14-86-181-CV, 1986 WL 13431 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] Nov. 20, 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
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